

Message Text

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ACTION H-03

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R 301135Z APR 76

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1276

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 3034

PLEASE PASS TO SENATOR HASKELL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OREP (HASKELL, FLOYD K) IS

SUBJECT: CODEL HASKELL-FINAL REPORT

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: SENATOR HASKELL VISITED ISRAEL AND WEST BANK APRIL 25-28 AND MET WITH PRIME MINISTER RABIN, FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON AND DEFENSE MINISTER PERES. HE ALSO HAD MEETINGS WITH DR MOHAMMED SHARIF, WEST BANK UNRA DIRECTOR; RAMALLAH'S MAYOR KARIN KHALAF; PROFESSOR MATTI PELED, CHAIRMAN OF ISRAELI COUNCIL FOR ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE; PROFESSOR URIEL SIMON, NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY; AND ANN LESCH OF AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE. THIS MESSAGE WAS NOT REPEAT NOT CLEARED WITH SENATOR BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. END SUMMARY.

W. PRIMIN RABIN BEGAN MEETING WITH SENATOR HASKELL BY ASKING ABOUT ATTITUDES OF ARAB LEADERS SENATOR HAD MET. SENATOR EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD FOUND FEELING OF RECOGNITION FOR ISRAEL COUPLED WITH HOPE FOR SOLUTION OF PALESTINIAN PROBLEM PLUS GENUINE DESIRE FOR PEACE. IN REPLY TO SENATOR'S QUESTION ABOUT ISRAEL'S ATTITUDE TOWARD PALESTINIANS, RABIN RECALLED THAT ISRAEL HAD EXPERIENCED 28 YEARS OF WAR. FACT THAT ARABS SEE ISRAEL AS FACT HAD NO MEANING BECAUSE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION WAS RECONCILIATION OF ISRAEL AS JEWISH STATE. ESSENCE OF ISRAEL'S
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POLICY WAS DESIRE FOR PEACE. HOWEVER, PROBLEM WAS HOW TO GET

THERE. ONE IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF PEACE WAS END TO STATE OF WAR. ANOTHER WAS OPEN BOUNDARIES AND OTHER FORMS OF COOPERATION. PROBLEM, RABIN CONTINUED, WAS NOT HOW TO SOLVE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, BUT HOW TO GET PEACE. RABIN SAID THAT ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO U.S., HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE HOW TO PROCEED WITH MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS. THERE WERE TWO BASIC APPROACHES FOCUSED ON END OF STATE OF WAR: THROUGH GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE OR ANOTHER NON-FINAL SETTLEMENT. SENATOR ASKED RABIN WHAT WAS ISRAEL'S VIEW OF GENERAL STRUCTURE OF PEACE. RABIN EXPLAINED THAT IN FIRST INSTANCE IT MEANT END TO STATE OF WAR, REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES, AND FLOW OF INFORMATION AND TRADE. SECONDLY, IT WAS QUESTION OF BOUNDARIES. ISRAEL HAD NO PROBLEM WITH LEBANON. HOWEVER, WITH SYRIA, ISRAEL NEEDED TO MAINTAIN A FOOTHOLD ON GOLAN HEIGHTS; EXACT WIDTH WAS ISSUED FOR NEGOTIATION. CONCERNING EGYPT, ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO SEE BULK OF SINAI RETURNED, WITH ISRAELI PRESENCE, BUT NOT SOVEREIGNTY, AT SHARM EL SHEIK. FOR JORDAN, THERE WAS POSSIBILITY TO FIND SOLUTION BECAUSE MOST PALESTINIANS WERE INCLUDED IN JORDAN. RABIN DID NOT THINK IT WAS ADVISABLE TO DRAW MAPS AT THIS TIME AND MENTIONED ALLON PLAN AS EXAMPLE OF PRACTICAL PROCESS TO BEGIN IN MEANINGFUL WAY. RABIN REVIEWED SINAI II AGREEMENT AND SAID THAT U.S. HAD ACTED AS MEDIATOR BUT NOT ARBITRATOR. PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD SAID THAT PARTIES TO CONFLICT MUST BE PARTIES TO PEACE: THIS WAS STILL WISEST COURSE, RABIN CONCLUDED.

3. FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON REVIEWED ALLON PLAN, CALLING IT SIMPLE PROPOSAL BASED ON COMPROMISE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT BOTH ARAB INTERESTS AND ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS FOR DEFENSIBLE BORDERS. HE EXPOUNDED THESIS THAT DESPITE ADVENT OF MODERN WEAPONRY, MILITARY DEFENSE WAS BASED ON TOPOGRAPHY TO EVEN GREATER DEGREE THAN PREVIOUSLY. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY TRUE FOR ISRAEL WHICH NEEDED TIME TO MOBILIZE ITS RESERVES BECAUSE IT HAD TO FIGHT CONVENTIONAL WAR BECAUSE ATOMIC WAR WAS OUT OF QUESTION. ISRAEL'S BASIC DESIRE WAS TO DEFEND ITSELF, BY ITSELF, FOR ITSELF. BUT ISRAEL WOULD NEVER GO BACK TO PRE-1967 LINES BECAUSE THAT WOULD MEAN BEGINNING OF END AND CERTAIN MILITARY DEFEAT FOR ISRAEL. ALLON SAID THAT AFTER SEEING WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO CHRISTIAN MINORITY IN LEBANON, ISRAEL WAS REINFORCED IN ITS BELIEF THAT IT COULD NEVER DEPEND ON ANYONE ELSE. WHILE ARABS COULD AFFORD DEFEAT, ISRAEL CANNOT. ALLON EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR U.S. CONFIDENTIAL

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ASSISTANCE BUT POINTED OUT THAT ISRAEL ALSO GAVE. MOREOVER, COMPARED TO OTHERS, U.S. ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL IS MOST COST EFFECTIVE. TO ILLUSTRATE THIS POINT, ALLON REVIEWED DEVELOPMENTS OF SEPT 1970 WHEN U.S. AND ISRAEL COOPERATED CLOSELY TO PREVENT CATASTROPHE IN JORDAN. HE ALSO SAID THAT ISRAEL'S CURRENT POLICY TOWARD LEBANON IS VERY MUCH IN U.S. INTEREST. HOWEVER, ALLON EMPHASIZED THAT ISRAEL COULD NEVER RETREAT TO BORDERS WHICH WERE NOT DEFENSIBLE BECAUSE TO DO SO WOULD FORCE ISRAEL

TO "DESPERATE MEASURES" UPON WHICH HE DID NOT WISHT TO ELABORATE. SENATOR HASKELL ASKED IF THERE WERE PEACE WHETHER ISRAEL COULD LIVE WITHOUT FEAR OF ARABS. ALLON AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE PROBLEM BUT IT WAS RISK WHICH HAD TO BE TAKEN. HE BELIEVED IN JEWISH-ARAB COOPERATION BUT THERE WERE ALWAYS PROBLEMS IN PLURALISTIC SOCIETIES; HE MENTIONED INDIA, IRAW, LEBANON, CYPRUS AND IRELAND AS EXAMPLES. SENATOR HASKELL OBSERVED THAT PRESENT SITUATION COULD NOT GO ON AND THAT PERHAPS SOMEONE FROM OUTSIDE SHOULD SUGGEST OUTLINE FOR PEACE. ALLON REPLIED THAT ISRAEL WAS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE AND HAD OFFERED TO DO SO ON MANY OCCASIONS.

4. DEFENSE MINISTER PERES SAID THAT ONE PROBLEM WITH ARAB WORLD WAS THAT IT HAD ACHIEVED UNITY IN NEGATIVE SENSE AND NOT IN POSITIVE SENSE. THEREFORE, IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR ARABS TO AGREE ON COMPROMISES WHICH WERE NECESSARY FOR PEACE AND FOR WHICH ISRAEL WAS READY. PERES EXPLAINED THAT ARAB DEMAND THAT ISRAEL WITHDRAW TO PRE-1967 LINES WOULD PUT ISRAEL IN IN-DEFENSIBLE POSITION. PERES REITERATED HIS OPINION THAT PEACE WILL COME IN TEN YEARS BECAUSE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WILL CONSUME MOST NATIONS' ENERGIES AND ALSO BECAUSE WEAPONS WERE BECOMING SO EXPENSIVE THAT NO ONE COULD AFFORT THEM. SENATOR HASKELL ASKED PERES WHY ISRAEL COULD NOT NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH PLO. PERES REPLIED THAT: PLO WAS MOST EXTREME PALESITINIAN GROUP; IT WAS NOT ELECTED; IT WAS DEDICATED TO ISRAEL'S DESTRUCTION; AND SUCH ACTION MEANT DIVORCING KING HUSSEIN FROM WEST BANK. MOREOVER, PLO WAS COMMITTED TO CREATION OF PALESTINIAN STATE, WHICH UNDER ARAFAT WOULD MEAN SOVIET ARMS AT JERUSALEM'S GATES AND WITHIN RANGE OF TEL AVIV. SENATOR SAID THAT ARAB LEADERS HAD TOLD HIM THAT ARAFAT WAS MODERATE AND THAT EQUITABLE SOLUTION TO PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WAS ONLY BASIS FOR PEACE. PERES OBSERVED THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS UNDERSTANDABLY MORE WORRIED ABOUT COMMUNISM, BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL, THAN ABOUT MIDDLE EAST

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CONFLICT. WHILE ARAFAT WAS MODERATE COMPARED TO GEORGE HABASH, FACT WAS THAT TEN MINUTES AFTER ISRAEL SIGNED AN AGREEMENT WITH PLO, HABASH WOULD REPLACE ARAFAT. PERES SAID THAT REAL TRAGEDY IN M-E WAS ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL COMPARED TO ARAB MAJORITY IN 20 STATES. WHEN ARABS ARE MAJORITY, THEY DO NOT ACT RESPONSIBLY, BUT WHEN THEY ARE MINORITY, THEY ARE NOT CONTENT. HE POINTED OUT THAT ARABS ON WEST BANK ARE BETTER OFF ECONOMICALLY AND MORE EXPERIENCED IN DEMOCRACY THAN ANY OTHER COMPARABLE NUMBER OF ARABS. BUT PERES SAW SOME GOOD SIGNS:

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INFO OCT-01 NEA-07 ISO-00 AID-01 SS-07 NSC-06 /025 W

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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PLEASE PASS TO SENATOR HASKELL

THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN OUT MANEUVERED; ISRAEL HAD SIGNED TWO AGREEMENTS WITH EGYPT AND ONE WITH SYRIA; AND GREAT DEAL OF PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON WEST BANK. HOWEVER, TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WITH RUSSIAN SUPPORT (READ PLO) CAST A HEAVY SHADOW ON THESE DEVELOPMENTS.

5. SENATOR MET WITH KARIN KHALAF, RECENTLY REELECTED MAYOR OF RAMALLAH, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MUNICIPAL COUNCILMEN JUSEF FARHAT AND REVEREND AUDEH G RANTISI (ARAB EVANGELICAL CHURCH). KHALAF, WHO SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED 74 PERCENT OF VOTES, DESCRIBED ISRAEL AS NOT TREATING WEST BANK RESIDENTS AS HUMAN BEINGS. RATHER, THEY WERE GIVEN ORDERS BY MILITARY OFFICERS. GOI WANTED TO CREATE WEST BANK LEADERSHIP WHICH WOULD LET ISRAEL CONTINUE OCCUPATION. HOWEVER, PALESTINIANS WERE PROUD PEOPLE WHO WANTED THEIR OWN STATE. THEY DID NOT WANT TO BE REGARDED AS REFUGEES AS IN UN RESOLUTION 242; THEY WANTED SAME RIGHTS AS ISRAELIS. FOR EXAMPLE, GUSH EMUNIM COULD MARCH THROUGH WEST BANK BUT CITIZENS OF RAMALLAH COULD NOT MARCH IN PROTEST. KHALAF SAID GOI CALLED HIM PLO REPRESENTATIVE; ACTUALLY PLO REPRESENTED HIM AND MOST PEOPLE ON WEST BANK. KHALAF TOLD SENATOR HASKELL THAT WEST BANK MUNICIPAL COUNCILS WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE \$100 MILLION IN USG ASSISTANCE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TO MAKE UP FOR PAUCITY OF FUNDS PROVIDED

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BY GOI. THIS AID WAS ALSO NEEDED BECAUSE OF PROHIBITION ON TRAVEL WHICH ISRAEL HAD LEVIED ON KHALAF AND OTHER LEADERS WHO HAD SIGNED PRO-RABAT PETITION AND WHICH MEANT KHALAF COULD NOT TRAVEL TO RAISE FUNDS.

6. SENATOR HASKELL CALLED ON DR MOHAMMED SHARIF, DIRECTOR OF UNRWA FOR WEST BANK AND ANTRANIG BAKERJIAN, UNRWA AREA OFFICER FOR JERUSALEM. SHARIF REVIEWED UNRWA'S OPERATIONS AND SITUATION OF REFUGEES LIVING IN WEST BANK. SENATOR ALSO HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH GEN (RETIRED) MATTI PELED, CHAIRMAN OF ISRAELI COUNCIL FOR ISRAELI -PALESTINIAN PEACE, PROFESSOR URIEL SIMON OF ISRAEL'S NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY, AND ANN LESCH, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE.

7. RESIDENT NBC CORRESPONDENT COVERED SENATOR HASKELL'S VISIT FOR REPORT ON GOI ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE MEMBER OF CONGRESS DURING VISIT TO ISRAEL. EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING TRANSCRIPT OR VIDEO TAPE OF NBC'S PRESENTATION.

8. SENATOR DID NOT REPEAT NOT HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THIS MESSAGE BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE.
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